ADR-0011: OT/IT Convergence Standards for Agentic Systems
Status
Proposed
Date
2026-02-12
Context
The Agentic Engineering Charter calls for defining best practices for OT/IT convergence and establishing design patterns for distributed industrial intelligence.
0xSCADA already bridges the OT/IT divide — off-chain real-time control (OT) with on-chain governance and audit (IT). However, as agentic systems operate across both domains, we need formal standards for how agents traverse the OT/IT boundary.
The fundamental tension:
| Dimension | OT Priority | IT Priority |
|---|---|---|
| Availability | 99.999% uptime | Planned maintenance windows |
| Latency | <10ms deterministic | Best-effort, seconds acceptable |
| Change velocity | Slow, validated, tested | Continuous deployment |
| Security model | Air-gapped, physically secured | Defense-in-depth, patched frequently |
| Data model | Real-time tags, registers | Relational, document, event-stream |
| Lifecycle | 15-30 year asset life | 3-5 year refresh cycles |
Agents that don't respect these differences will either compromise OT safety or be too constrained to provide IT-layer value.
Decision
We define a Convergence Layer Architecture that provides formal boundaries, translation services, and protocol standards for agents operating across OT and IT domains.
1. Domain Boundary Model
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ IT DOMAIN │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ Dashboard │ │ Analytics │ │ Governance │ │
│ │ (React) │ │ (Batch) │ │ (Chain) │ │
│ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ └──────┬───────┘ │
│ └─────────────────┼─────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
├────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ CONVERGENCE LAYER │
│ │ │
│ ┌────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ ┌─────────┐ ┌───────┴───────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ │ │
│ │ │Protocol │ │ Data │ │Security │ │Time │ │ │
│ │ │Gateway │ │ Translator │ │Boundary │ │Sync │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ │OPC-UA │ │Tag→Event │ │mTLS │ │PTP/NTP │ │ │
│ │ │MQTT │ │Register→JSON │ │Firewall │ │TAI │ │ │
│ │ │Modbus │ │Alarm→Alert │ │IDS/IPS │ │ │ │ │
│ │ └─────────┘ └───────────────┘ └─────────┘ └─────────┘ │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
├────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ OT DOMAIN │
│ │ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌─────┴────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ PLCs/RTUs │ │ Field I/O │ │ Safety │ │
│ │ (Realtime) │ │ (Sensors) │ │ (SIS) │ │
│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
2. Agent Domain Restrictions
Agents are classified by their domain authorization:
| Agent Type | OT Access | Convergence Layer | IT Access | Example |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IT-Only | None | Read via gateway | Full | Dashboard, analytics |
| Convergence | Read via gateway | Full | Full | Ops Agent, Compliance Agent |
| OT-Supervised | Read + bounded write | Full | Full | ChangeControl Agent (AC-3) |
| OT-Native | Direct (embedded) | Publish only | None | Safety PLC logic |
Critical rule: No IT-domain agent may directly address OT-domain devices. All cross-domain communication flows through the Convergence Layer.
3. Protocol Standards
| Protocol | Domain | Use Case | Agent Interaction |
|---|---|---|---|
| OPC-UA | OT ↔ Convergence | Primary industrial protocol | Agents subscribe via gateway |
| MQTT | Convergence ↔ IT | Event streaming, telemetry | Agents publish/subscribe topics |
| gRPC | IT ↔ IT | Agent-to-agent communication | Direct with mTLS (ADR-0008) |
| JSON-RPC | Convergence | Blockchain interaction | Batch anchoring, governance |
| Modbus TCP | OT (legacy) | Legacy device access | Gateway translation only |
4. Data Translation Standards
The Convergence Layer translates between OT and IT data models:
interface ConvergenceTranslation {
// OT → IT: Tag data becomes typed events
translateTag(tag: OpcUaTag): IndustrialEvent;
// IT → OT: Commands become bounded setpoint changes
translateCommand(cmd: AgentCommand): SetpointChange;
// Validation: Every translation is constraint-checked
validateBoundary(translation: Translation): BoundaryCheck;
}
// Every cross-domain translation is logged
interface TranslationAuditEntry {
source_domain: 'OT' | 'IT';
target_domain: 'OT' | 'IT';
agent: string;
translation_type: string;
input_hash: string;
output_hash: string;
boundary_check: 'PASS' | 'FAIL' | 'ESCALATE';
timestamp: string;
}
5. Time Synchronization
OT and IT systems have different time requirements. The Convergence Layer enforces:
- OT domain: PTP (IEEE 1588) or hardware timestamping, <1ms accuracy
- IT domain: NTP, <100ms accuracy acceptable
- Convergence Layer: Maps between time domains, records both timestamps
- Blockchain: Block timestamps used for ordering, not precision timing
- Agent actions: Logged with both OT-precision and IT-precision timestamps
6. Failure Isolation
If the IT domain fails, OT continues operating independently:
- OT control loops run locally on PLCs (never dependent on IT)
- Convergence Layer buffers events during IT outage
- Agents in M3: SAFE_HOLD if they lose Convergence Layer connectivity
- No IT failure can propagate to OT safety functions
Consequences
Positive
- Safety preservation: OT domain isolation maintained regardless of IT state
- Clear boundaries: Agents know exactly what they can access and how
- Auditability: Every cross-domain interaction is logged and hashable
- Vendor agnostic: Protocol standards support multi-vendor environments
- Charter alignment: Implements "Interoperability Over Lock-In" and "Safety First"
Negative
- Convergence Layer complexity: New infrastructure component to build and maintain
- Latency overhead: Cross-domain translation adds processing time
- Protocol diversity: Supporting multiple protocols increases testing surface
- Operational burden: Teams need both OT and IT skills
Neutral
- Aligns with Purdue Model / IEC 62443 zone concepts
- Compatible with existing 0xSCADA OPC-UA driver (ADR-0005)
- Can be implemented incrementally (start with OPC-UA gateway, expand protocols)
Alternatives Considered
Alternative 1: Flat Network with ACLs
Single network for OT and IT with access control lists.
Rejected because: Violates defense-in-depth; a compromised IT agent could reach OT devices. Unacceptable for safety-critical infrastructure.
Alternative 2: Complete Air Gap
Fully air-gapped OT with manual data transfer.
Rejected because: Prevents the real-time monitoring and agentic optimization that 0xSCADA enables. Air gaps also don't prevent all attacks (Stuxnet proved this).
Alternative 3: Cloud-First Architecture
Route all data through cloud services.
Rejected because: Adds unacceptable latency for OT operations, creates single point of failure, and raises data sovereignty concerns for industrial operators.